In R. v. Cope 2026 SCC 32, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed how sentencing judges must engage with sentencing circles in cases involving Indigenous offenders. Mr. Cope, a Mi’kmaw man with severe mental health challenges, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault against his intimate partner, and the Provincial Court ordered both an Indigenous Background Report and a sentencing circle. The resulting report recorded that community members did not believe more incarceration would help Mr. Cope and recommended a community‑based treatment plan as a more effective response to his offending and to the harm done. The sentencing judge nevertheless imposed a five‑year prison sentence. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to three years, less credit for time spent in pre‑sentence custody. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice O’Bonsawin held that a sentencing circle is more than a source of information: it is a distinct expression of Indigenous community perspectives on sentencing, and a judge who fails to meaningfully engage with it can fail to properly apply s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code (paras. 101–106). As the Court explained:
Sentencing circles provide an important means through which Indigenous communities express their views on how to address sentencing. They offer a unique opportunity for Indigenous perspectives on crime and punishment to be considered by the criminal justice system and address the alienation many Indigenous people feel related to that system. That setting can contribute to understanding the circumstances of both the offender and the victim. As this Court has said, true reconciliation is a long‑term project served by “braiding together” Indigenous law with non‑Indigenous legal traditions to form a “single, strong rope”. (emphasis added)
Judges are not bound by a circle’s recommendations, but they must reasonably engage with the perspectives it expresses. The majority identified three “hallmarks of meaningful engagement”: recognizing the circle as a distinct perspective on sentencing, conveying agreement or departure, and relating that engagement to the sentence imposed (para. 106).
The majority further emphasized that sentencing circles must be treated as a meaningful part of the sentencing process, rather than a superficial add‑on. When taken seriously, they serve core accountability purposes within the sentencing framework:
Sentencing judges must take seriously the direction given by Parliament and by this Court in Gladue and in Ipeelee to incorporate Indigenous perspectives. When a sentencing circle takes place, this means treating that circle as a bridge between the criminal justice system and Indigenous models of justice, not an exercise in performative tokenism, which will only erode trust, set back reconciliation and exacerbate the challenges Indigenous people face with the criminal justice system (see I.F., Akwesasne Justice Department, at paras. 13 and 29‑30). The voice of the Indigenous victim must also be treated seriously. Treating sentencing circles seriously serves the reconciliatory purpose underlying s. 718.2(e), the denunciation and deterrence of the disproportionate violence Indigenous women and girls face underlying ss. 718.04 and 718.201, and the ultimate purpose of criminal sentencing, which is to maintain a just, peaceful and safe society (s. 718).
The Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge erred in principle. She acknowledged Mr. Cope’s mental illness without relating it to his moral blameworthiness or to the sentence that would best serve the applicable objectives, and her failure to meaningfully engage with the circle’s perspective compounded that error (paras. 135–149). Because the error affected the sentence, the Court concluded that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was right to intervene, and it dismissed the Crown’s appeal, leaving in place the reduced three‑year sentence (paras. 150–152, 164–167). Four judges dissented. They would have restored the five‑year sentence and took a narrower view of the role of circles, treating engagement with them as best practice rather than a legal obligation (paras. 180, 264, 277).
Relevance of R. v. Cope to the HPOA
Cope is a criminal sentencing case, but its reasoning about the meaningful incorporation of Indigenous perspectives and legal traditions has implications for how professional regulators understand and use restorative processes.
With the introduction of the HPOA, s. 268 gives regulatory colleges the authority to incorporate restorative options into complaint and discipline processes. Under that provision, a college may order a respondent to participate in a process that reflects or is influenced by Indigenous practices, engage in mediation, or take other steps to resolve a matter with the person who experienced the respondent’s conduct.
Cope helps explain why colleges should make use of these tools, and why they are important.
First, Cope underscores that Indigenous processes can help repair harm and rebuild trust in institutions that have historically failed Indigenous peoples. The Court emphasizes that true reconciliation is a long‑term project, served by “braiding together” Indigenous law with non‑Indigenous legal traditions to form a “single, strong rope.” Sentencing circles are treated as one way of doing that work: a bridge between the criminal justice system and Indigenous models of justice, and a forum in which the perspectives of Indigenous victims and communities must be taken seriously.
A similar dynamic exists in health care: Indigenous patients and communities often have deep mistrust of the health‑care system and of professional regulators. For many Indigenous complainants, families and communities, the conventional college process may not feel like a meaningful way to address what happened. Processes shaped by Indigenous practices under s. 268 can offer a different kind of space, one that allows Indigenous participants to describe harm in their own terms, to identify what meaningful repair would look like for them and their community, and to see those understandings reflected in the college’s disciplinary response.
Second, Cope confirms that Indigenous processes can and do speak directly to core accountability objectives. The majority explains that sentencing circles are one way in which denunciation, deterrence, public safety and reconciliation are pursued. By analogy, restorative processes under s. 268, particularly those that reflect Indigenous practices, should be understood by colleges as mechanisms through which accountability is expressed, not as performative add-ons. They can require respondents to hear and acknowledge the impacts and harms of their conduct in a structured setting and to engage directly with the concerns raised by Indigenous patients, families, or communities.
Properly used, these processes can help address the mistrust Indigenous peoples feel toward health‑care institutions by:
1. creating spaces where Indigenous patients, families and communities can describe harm and needed repair in their own terms;
2. using Indigenous protocols, ceremonies or community‑led processes as part of how concerns are addressed, so that the process itself reflects Indigenous understandings of safety and accountability; and
3. embedding those practices within a disciplinary framework that still includes practice conditions, education, supervision or other measures needed to protect the public.
R. v. Cope 2026 SCC 32
By Samantha Olsen