A hypothetical scenario
Dr. Smith is the only family physician in a mountain town of 2,500 people. He coaches minor hockey, and he has delivered half the children in town. His clinic sits upstairs from the pharmacy Jane manages, and most of the prescriptions she fills carry his signature.
Jane is also his patient. After her daughter was born, she went to him three times with symptoms she now knows were postpartum depression. He called it the “baby blues”. On her third visit, with his receptionist in earshot, he told her to toughen up. A locum in the next town diagnosed her and got her into treatment.
Jane wants to complain to Dr. Smith’s regulator, the College. She also wants to keep her complaint confidential. She does not want Dr. Smith to know, because he is the only doctor her family can see, and because his prescriptions keep the pharmacy, and her job, running. She does not want the town to know, because then the town would know about her depression, and she would become thewoman who went after Dr. Smith.
Jane files her complaint and, with it, an application for a full identity protection order. The application lands on your desk.
What an order can do
Jane could have sent an unsigned letter instead. But under the Health Professions and Occupations Act (HPOA), a registrar may dismiss a complaint whose author cannot be identified or adopt it as the registrar’s own (s. 120(2)). Either way, she would no longer be a complainant.
An identity protection order, or IPO, leaves Jane as a complainant while controlling who learns that she complained.
Eligibility for an IPO is broad. Complainants, people who help the College, and people who experienced a practitioner’s conduct, may all apply (s. 236). A mandatory reporter, who cannot report anonymously, may also apply (s. 83(2)).
An order comes in two varieties. A “full” order keeps the applicant’s identity from everyone, the respondent included. A “partial” order lets the decision maker decide what information goes out, to whom, and on what conditions (s. 239(2)). A partial order allows a decision maker to set different conditions for different people. That flexibility is important where an application amounts to two different requests. Jane’s application, for example, seeks to protect her identity from both Dr. Smith and the town.
What to identify in an IPO application
The registrar decides any part of an application that concerns an administrative matter, and the investigation committee decides the rest (ss. 234, 235(2)). Colleges should discern from an application:
- whose identity needs protection;
- who the applicant wants their identity kept from; and
- what the applicant fears.
Jane fears retaliation from Dr. Smith respecting her family’s care and her livelihood. Jane also fears the town learning about her mental health history, and the social cost of complaining about a well-loved doctor.
What a decision maker must weigh
Before making or refusing an order, the decision maker, usually the investigation committee (s. 234), must consider four factors (s. 237(1)):
(a) the nature, scope, and gravity of the allegations;
(b) whether the applicant risks an adverse consequence if identified;
(c) whether the investigation can still proceed in a reasonably efficient and effective manner under an order; and
(d) whether, if a discipline proceeding follows, the respondent may suffer undue prejudice or significant procedural unfairness, or be unduly prevented from making a reasonable defence.
The applicant does not have to prove the risks she faces; a decision maker may infer risks from the circumstances, without requiring evidence (s. 237(2)). For example, Jane need not provide a letter from her psychiatrist. The facts of a small town, a sole physician, a shared building, and a mental health history may support an inference.
The nature of the allegations can pull in opposite directions. A grave allegation raises the stakes for the applicant, who faces more exposure and a greater risk of retaliation. It also raises the stakes for the respondent and calls for a more searching investigation. So the allegations that most justify protection can make full protection hard or impossible to obtain.
The guiding principles in HPOA s. 14(2) protect both the privacy of participants (para. (e)) and fairness to respondents (para. (d)). Section 14(4) tips conflicts toward the public or the individual over the practitioner, but only “to the extent reasonable in the circumstances.” That qualifier limits the reach of s. 14(4). An order that leaves a respondent no real chance to answer a complaint will rarely, if ever, be reasonable.
Keeping an applicant’s identity from the public may be an easy call
Shielding Jane’s identity from the general public is unlikely to interfere with an investigation. Investigators rarely need the general public to know who filed a complaint to gather records, interview witnesses, or put the allegations to Dr. Smith. Factors (c) and (d) barely come into play on this question, while factor (b) is strong.
Keeping an applicant’s identity from the respondent turns on two questions
Hiding an applicant’s identity from a respondent raises different issues, and it goes further than courts will go. A judge may let a plaintiff sue under her initials, but courts do not, as a rule, hide a plaintiff from the defendant she sues, because a defendant cannot answer an accuser he cannot identify. The HPOA allows it, but factors (c) and (d) set limits.
In practice, factors (c) and (d) pose two questions. Can the College investigate without the respondent knowing who the applicant is? Can the respondent answer without that knowledge? The answers usually depend on what the allegation rests on.
Some allegations rest on records. Suppose an office manager at a city clinic reports that a practitioner bills for appointments that never happened. The appointment book and the billing records will prove or disprove the allegation. The practitioner can answer them line by line without learning who sent the College to look, and a full IPO does not impede an investigation or a respondent’s ability to answer the case against him.
Other allegations may, however, rest on what happened between the applicant and the respondent. Jane’s complaint concerns her visits, her symptoms, and what Dr. Smith said to her in his examining room. He cannot pull her chart, recall the appointments, or call his receptionist as a witness unless he knows who Jane is. Investigators cannot collect her records from his clinic without revealing her identity. A full order would leave Dr. Smith facing a complaint with no patient attached. He could not answer it, and the College could not properly investigate it. In this sort of situation, theinvestigation committee may refuse to keep Jane’s identity from Dr. Smith.
What Jane might get as a “partial” order
Refusing full protection does not leave Jane unprotected. The decision maker may refuse a “full” IPO but still make a partial IPO. Dr. Smith could learn who she is, because the investigation cannot proceed otherwise, but the general public would learn nothing. For example, a partial IPO might:
- confine Jane’s identity to Dr. Smith, the investigators, and the receptionist (s. 239(2)(b));
- limit what each of them learns, so the receptionist hears about one remark and nothing about Jane’s diagnosis (s. 239(2)(a));
- bar each recipient from discussing the complaint or Jane’s identity with anyone else (s. 239(2)(c)); and
- direct how investigators approach the receptionist, who lives in the same small town (s. 239(2)(d)).
The Act also addresses some risks that come from Dr. Smith himself. A licensee must not take an adverse action against a complainant, a person who experienced the conduct, or their family members or business associates, because of a complaint or a belief that one was made (s. 91). Refusing to refer a patient, obstructing the transfer of her care, and acting or threatening to act against her personal or financial interests all count (ss. 92, 95). A licensee who contravenes s. 91, or who fails to comply with an order, commits misconduct (s. 11(1)(a)). The committee could direct that Dr. Smith be told all of this in writing when he learns who complained (s. 239(4)(b)).
A generous order may unravel at a discipline proceeding
A committee might be tempted to give Jane the full order anyway. But that choice may backfire at the discipline stage. If the registrar later seeks a citation, the director of discipline must receive any order, with reasons, where the protected person’s identity might be an issue at the hearing, or the person might be identified there (s. 137(2)). The director may ask for the order to be varied (s. 161(c)), or try to cure a problem that the IPO causes, such as by asking the protected person to consent in writing to disclosure (ss. 162(2), 250(1)(b)). If anonymity would unduly prevent the respondent from making a reasonable defence, and the resulting unfairness is significant and cannot be cured, the director must refuse to issue the citation (s. 162(1)(b)(i)). Before making a “full” order, a committee should ask whether the respondent could still answer the case at a hearing.
The notice of intent, and Jane’s choice to end her own complaint
The committee does not rule on Jane’s application immediately. The registrar first sends her a notice of intent setting out what the committee proposes to do and why (s. 238(a)). If the committeeintends to refuse a “full” IPO, Jane has three options, and 30 days to choose either of the last two:
- she can accept the partial order and let the investigation go ahead;
- she can ask the committee to reconsider (ss. 240(5), 381); or
- she can apply for a termination order. If she applies for one, the committee must grant it (s. 240(3)), and the investigation ends (s. 263(2)(b)).
The termination order provisions of the HPOA give complainants, and people who experienced the respondent’s conduct, something like a veto (s. 240(1)(a)). If the College will not protect Jane’s identity on her terms, she may end the investigation rather than be named.
A termination order does not affect any other complaint about the same or similar facts (s. 240(4)). If Dr. Smith has failed other new mothers in town, their complaints may still go forward.
By Rachel Noble